This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) , Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011) obtain.
equilibrium payoff set when sufficient conditions for a folk theorem are not met. In the case of games with imperfect public monitoring, our knowledge about the limiting set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs derives from the characterizations of , and its generalizations by Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi (2007) , and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011) in terms of a parameterized family of nonlinear programs: whenever the characterization applies, (i) the limit of the equilibrium payoff set is well-defined, and (ii) it is compact, convex and semialgebraic. 1 This paper provides a characterization of this limit set that gives additional insights and results. We study the dual of the program considered in Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011) . We show that this dual program offers several advantages over the primal: (i) it admits a straightforward interpretation; (ii) because the constraint set depends on the parameters of the program through the parameters' signs only, it is easy to solve especially for repeated games; (iii) the various sufficient conditions for a folk theorem for repeated and stochastic games with public monitoring that are found in the literature obtain effortlessly.
To demonstrate the tractability of the dual program, we exploit it to establish that the limit set of pure-strategy (perfect public) equilibrium payoffs in repeated games is a polytope (whenever the characterization applies). We provide an example of a two-player game with two signals for which the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs is not a polytope when mixed strategy equilibria are considered.
While our analysis focuses on the limit case in which the discount factor tends to one, duality has already been applied to the case of repeated games by Cheng (2004) , who obtains a characterization for a fixed discount factor that is the counterpart of ours. To our knowledge, Cheng is the first author to use duality to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games. A related application of duality to incentive problems in a static context can be found in Obara and Rahman (2010) . On the other hand, duality is a standard tool in Markov decision processes, the "one-player" version of a stochastic game.
The Dual Program
In this section, we provide a characterization of the limit payoff set in stochastic games with public signals, or more precisely, another characterization of the nonlinear programs whose solution is key to the description of this payoff set. We follow Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011, hereafter HSTV) for notation and assumptions. At each stage, the game is in one state, and players simultaneously choose actions. Nature then determines both the current payoff, the next state and a public signal, as a function of the current state and the action profile.
The sets S of possible states, I of players, A i of actions available to player i, and Y of public signals are assumed finite. Given an action profile a ∈ A := × i A i , and a state s ∈ S, we denote by r(s, a) ∈ R I the payoff (or reward) profile when in state s given a, and by p(t, y|s, a) the joint probability of moving to state t ∈ S and of getting the public signal y ∈ Y . A repeated game is the special case in which there is a singleton state.
At the end of each period, the only information publicly available to all players consists of nature's choices: the next state together with the public signal. When properly interpreting Y , this includes the case of perfect monitoring and the case of publicly observed payoffs.
In each period n = 1, 2, . . ., the state s n is observed, the stage game is played, the action profile a n is realized, and the public signal y n is then revealed. The stochastic game is parameterized by the initial state s 1 . The public history at the beginning of period n is then h n = (s 1 , y 1 , . . . , s n−1 , y n−1 , s n ). We set H 1 := S, the set of initial states. The set of public histories at the beginning of period n is therefore H n := (S × Y ) n−1 × S, and we let H := n≥1 H n denote the set of all public histories. The private history for player i at the beginning of period n is a sequence h i n = (s 1 , a 1 , y 1 , . . . , s n−1 , a n−1 , y n−1 , s n ), and we similarly define
Every pair of initial state s 1 and strategy profile σ generates a probability distribution over histories in the obvious way and thus also generates a distribution over sequences of the players' rewards. Players seek to maximize their payoff, that is, the average discounted sum of their rewards, using a common discount factor δ < 1. Thus, the payoff of player i ∈ I if the initial state is s 1 and the players follow the strategy profile σ is defined as
A strategy σ i is public if it depends on the public history only, and not on player i's private information. That is, a public strategy is a map σ i : H → ∆(A i ). A perfect public equilibrium (hereafter, PPE, or simply equilibrium) is a profile of public strategies such that, given any period n and public history h n , the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium from that period on.
We denote by E(s, δ) ⊂ R I the (compact) set of PPE payoffs of the game with initial state s ∈ S and discount factor δ < 1. All statements about convergence of, or equality between sets are understood in the sense of the Hausdorff distance d(A, B) between sets A, B.
The main element of the characterization of HSTV is the solution to the following nonlinear program, where λ ∈ R I is fixed. Given a state s ∈ S and a map x : S × Y → R S×I , we denote by Γ(s, x) the one-shot game with action sets A i and payoff function
where x t (s, y) ∈ R I is the t-th component of x(s, y).
Given λ ∈ R I , we denote by P(λ) the maximization program
where the supremum is taken over all v ∈ R I , x : S × Y → R S×I , and α = (α s ) s ∈ (× i∈I ∆(A i )) S such that (i) For each s, α s is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v of the game Γ(s, x);
(ii) For each T ⊆ S, for each permutation ϕ : T → T and each map ψ : T → Y , one has
The program P(λ) is a generalization to stochastic games of the program introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (1994) for repeated games, based in turn on the recursive representation of the payoff set given by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990).
Denote by k(λ) ∈ [−∞, +∞] the value of P(λ). HSTV prove that the feasible set of P(λ) is non-empty, so that k(λ) > −∞, and that the value of P(λ) is finite, so that k(λ) < +∞.
HSTV assume that the limit set of PPE payoffs is independent of the initial state: for all s, t ∈ S, lim δ→1 d(E(s, δ), E(t, δ)) = 0 (Assumption A). HSTV prove that, under Assumption
A and a full-dimensionality condition, the family of programs (indexed by λ) characterizes the limit set of (perfect public) equilibrium payoffs as δ → 1,
As our focus is the program itself, we shall not need Assumption A for what follows.
For a fixed Markov strategy (α s ) s , the feasible set is non-empty if and only if for all s, α s is admissible, in the sense that, for all i, if there exists ν i s ∈ ∆(A i ) such that, for all (t, y),
Indeed, it follows from Fan (1956 ) that there exists
is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(s, x) if and only if for each s, α s is admissible. Adding a constant to each x t (s, y) that is independent of (t, y), we may assume that the equilibrium payoff v s is independent of s. Finally, considering any i for which λ i = 0, we may add (or subtract if
, independent of s, t, y, so that the constraint (ii) is satisfied. Define the programP(λ) as follows: The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 1 For all λ ∈ R I , the programs P(λ) andP(λ) yield the same value.
The constraints appearing inP(λ) have a natural interpretation: each player can only deviate to a strategy (α i s ) s that leads to a distribution over signals and states-via the invariant distribution-that is the same for all players' deviations. That is, it is as if adversarial players were choosing the deviation strategies (α i s ) s,i in a coordinated manner, subject to the constraint that they cannot be told apart, whether through the public signals or through the state transitions, and the objective is to minimize the λ-weighted average payoff given those deviations.
(Notice, however, that "deviations" are defined in an unusual way so thatα 
and a ∈ Ex(A) (the set of action profiles achieving some extreme point of the feasible payoff set).
Note now that the restriction onα, when α = a is pure, is that p(·|α
then imply thatα i = a i for non-coordinate directions λ. As a final remark, one can characterize the limit set of pure-strategy PPE payoffs by modifying the primal P(λ) so that the supremum is taken over pure strategies α ∈ A S . The corresponding dualP(λ) is given by taking the supremum over all admissible pure strategies.
Proof of Theorem 1
Fix throughout some strategy (α s ) s such that α s is admissible for all s. We can rewrite P(λ)
and, for all s, i, a i , t,y p t, y|s, a i , α
This is a linear program for (x, v). The first set of constraint ensures that α s yields the same payoff v in all states, the second that playing α s is a Nash equilibrium, and the third is the same constraint as (ii). Because we assumed that α s is admissible for all s, the feasible set is non-empty, and because the value of this program is bounded above by k(λ), it is finite. We 4 We may think of a Markov decision process (MDP) with irreducible transitions as a stochastic game with a single player and no signal. In this case, take a pure optimal Markov strategy a * = (a * s ) s in the MDP without discounting. The only deviations (α s ) s that satisfy the constraints in the dualP(1) must improve the objective (they must assign non-positive weights to the actions other than a * s , and weight at least one to a * s ) so that, minimizing over those deviations, it is best to setα s = a * s for all s. It follows that (β s ) s is the invariant distribution under the optimal strategy a * , and the value of the program is equal to the optimal expected (undiscounted) average payoff of the MDP. One can solve the other dualP(−1) similarly.
shall 
There is no loss in assuming λ i = 0 for all i (we focus on the relevant subset of players otherwise).
Define then β Note that, taking the sum over (t, y), we have
and so β i s =: β s is nonnegative and independent of i. Furthermore, by adding over s, we get that T,ϕ,ψ |T |η T ϕψ = 1. Note also that, if β s = 0 for some s, then T ∋s,ϕ,ψ η T ϕψ = 0, and so, because η T ϕψ ≥ 0, it follows that a i p (t, y|s, α s ) − p t, y|s, a i , α Therefore, we might as well assume β s > 0 for all s.
Note that for all s, i, 
with large M so that ξ 
Note that if β s > 0, then it follows from (1) that p (t, y|s,α 
Conversely, if (β s ) s is an invariant distribution ofp (t × Y |s), then it follows from Lemma 1 of HSTV that there exists η T ϕψ ≥ 0 that satisfies (1).
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Thus we can rewrite our problem without using η T ϕψ as follows: 
The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Repeated Games
This section focuses on repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Throughout, the sets of actions and signals are finite, and attention is restricted to perfect public equilibria. For a fixed discount factor δ < 1, E(δ) denotes the set of mixed-strategy PPE payoffs, and E p (δ)
denotes the set of pure-strategy PPE payoffs. The limits of these equilibrium payoff sets (as δ → 1) are denoted by E = lim δ→1 E(δ) and E p = lim δ→1 E p (δ), respectively. We show that (i) E p has either empty interior or is a polytope; (ii) the result does not extend to E, which includes mixed-strategy equilibria.
The characterization of implies that these limits E and E p are well-defined, and that E and E p are compact, convex and semialgebraic by the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem. (The extension by Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi (2007) establishes that this is true even if these limit sets have empty interior.) In addition, both E and E p are independent of the availability of a public randomization device. In the absence of such a device, none of these properties (except compactness) holds for a fixed discount factor, as explained below.
Because their program is such that the vector of weights λ appears both in the constraints and in the objective, it is difficult to obtain sharper results from the primal. In contrast, because the constraints in the dual only involve the signs of the weights, for each admissible action profile a ∈ A and each orthant of λ, we have finitely many linear constraints onα, which are independent of λ. The result then follows since there are only finitely many candidates ofα that can minimize the linear objective.
Corollary 1
Assume that E p has non-empty interior. Then E p is a polytope. For each ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} I , we define
We also defineΛ(ζ) as the closure of Λ(ζ)
Taking the closure simplifies our exposition by allowing us to use standard results on polyhedra and polyhedral cones, which are defined by weak inequalities.
For each ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} I and λ ∈Λ(ζ), we have
since if ζ i = 0 but λ i = 0, then the constraint set D(a, sgn(λ)) is less restrictive than D(a, ζ).
Therefore, we have
Since E p is bounded, it is enough to show that for each ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} I ,
For each admissible a ∈ A and ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} I , note that D(a, ζ) is a polyhedron, and hence finitely generated, i.e., there exist finitely many points β 1 , . . . , β m ∈ × i∈I R A i and finitely many directions β m+1 , . . . , β n ∈ × i∈I R A i such that anyα ∈ D(a, ζ) is represented aŝ
the minimization problem
has a solution in D * (a, ζ). Note that D * (a, ζ) is finite and depends on λ only through its sign ζ.
For each admissible a ∈ A, ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} I , andα ∈ D * (a, ζ), letΛ(a,α, ζ) be the set of all directions λ ∈Λ(ζ) such that the max-min problem
is solved at (a,α). Let Φ(ζ) be the set of selections ϕ of D * (·, ζ), i.e., the set of functions that
henceΛ(a,α, ζ) is a finite union of polyhedral cones, and thus its convex hull is a polyhedral cone (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 19.6 ).
Thus, for each ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} I ,
Here, for each (a,α, ζ), since the convex hull ofΛ(a,α, ζ) is a polyhedral cone, its polar cone (with vertex r(a,α)), λ∈Λ(a,α,ζ) {v | λ · (v − r(a,α)) ≤ 0}, is also a polyhedral cone (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 19.2.2) . Therefore, E p (ζ) is a finite intersection of polyhedral cones, which is a polyhedron.
This corollary raises a natural question: does the corollary extend to mixed strategies? This is obviously the case when the assumptions for the folk theorem are satisfied-in particular, when monitoring is perfect. We conclude this section with an example establishing that the answer is Note that each player's minmax payoff is 0, and the unique static Nash equilibrium is ( 
Clearly, this set is not a polytope. See Figure 1 . As E(δ) → E, this example shows that the bound of Abreu and Sannikov (2011) on the number of extreme points of E(δ) cannot possibly extend to mixed strategies and imperfect monitoring. -Is E p a polytope even when its interior is empty (in the case in which there are more than two players)?
-Is the limit set of pure-strategy equilibrium payoffs also a polytope in the case of finite stochastic games? (The feasible limit payoff set is known to be a polytope.)
-Does the example showing that E need not be a polytope also establish the same result for E(δ) (with a public randomization device) for high enough discount factors?
-What are the properties of the set of all Nash and sequential (rather than perfect public) equilibrium payoffs and their limits (if they exist) as δ → 1?
Appendix: Sketch of computations for the example
We use the dual programP(λ) to compute the maximum score k(λ) for each direction
In particular, we analyze 8 cases (λ 1 , λ 2 0) separately.
In the case of λ = (1, 0), we achieve k(1, 0) = 8 by enforcing α = (D, L).
In the case of λ 1 > 0 and λ 2 = 1, we achieve (i) k(λ 1 , 1) = 5λ 1 + 9 by enforcing α = (U, L)
, (ii) In the case of λ = (0, 1), we achieve k(0, 1) = 9 by enforcing α = (U, L).
In the case of λ 1 < 0 and λ 2 = 1, we achieve (i) k(λ 1 , 1) = 5λ 1 + 9 by enforcing α = (U, L)
if − .
In the case of λ = (−1, 0), we achieve k(−1, 0) = 0 by enforcing α = (U, R).
In the case of λ 1 < 0 and λ 2 = −1, the south-west border of E is driven by λ 1 ≈ −7.5, where the maximal score is achieved by enforcing either α = (U, R), which attains k((λ 1 , −1), (U, R)) = − By equating the two values of k((λ 1 , −1), α), we have
